



This paper analyzes in three contexts the effects of changing economic conditions and varying
economic perspectives on the way land is considered in economic doctrine. The first considers
agricultural land use where agriculture is connected to the rest of the economy exclusively through
input and commodity markets, and when all other parts of the economy are assumed to remain
constant. The second connects agriculture to the remainder of the economy by virtue of a shared
natural environment, facilitating a discussion of natural resource and environmental economics
in relation to agricultural, institutional, and land economics. The third context permits economic
change in the entire economy with particular attention given to population density, space, and
distance. Private and public decision making are discussed with attention to federal, state, and local
division of powers.
Key Words:  applicability limits, central place theory, public and private decision making, rural
economics
The Inconstant Role of Land in
Economic Doctrine
Land plays numerous roles in economic doctrine.
Economies always are in a state of change as they
move on their unique trajectories through time.
Further, those who make use of economic doctrine
have different motivations for doing so. If the role
of land in economic doctrine is to be understood,
one must account not only for economic change, but
also the motivation of economists.
The applied economist does not have the luxury
of using a single conceptual lens to view reality.
Land provides a different bundle of goods and servi-
ces in the rural areas of the Great Plains than it does
in the urbanized Northeast. Further, the motivation
of researchers who seek to understand land varies
among, as well as within, geographic situations.
When speaking or writing about land, economists
will not communicate well even within their own
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discipline, unless the economic characteristics of
land, as well as the motivation of analysts, are recog-
nized explicitly.
Three distinct contexts are considered in this
paper. One is concerned with the agricultural firm
and the agricultural industry in an economy wherein
the remainder of the economy is placed under the
heading of “all other conditions remain the same.”
1
A different context arises if the agricultural use of
land has effects on the remainder of the economy
that cannot be reflected in the outcomes of unregu-
lated markets. I make reference to external effects
which are not consistent with market-generated input
or output prices under “ideal” conditions, a condition
described in introductions to numerous texts in envi-
ronmental economics. The third context considered
involves the use of land as a policy instrument to in-
fluence the nature, direction, or impact of economic
activity.
1 See Hausman (1992, chapter 8) for the methodological justification
of the phrase “all other conditions remain the same.” He refers to John
Stuart Mill who believed the laws of economics would hold true in
practice if it were not for “disturbing influences.” Holding “all other
conditions the same” was a means of removing the effect of “disturb-
ing influences.” When read today, the writing of Mill on the subject
seems somewhat quaint. Upon reflection, however, Hausman shows
the issues identified by Mill are highly relevant to the way economics
is practiced in our time.
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 32/1 (April 2003): 18S32
Copyright 2003 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics AssociationCastle Land, Economic Change, and Agricultural Economics   19
The view here, then, is that land plays different
roles in economic affairs, and there exists more than
one valid analytic approach that may be applied to
land. This view is consistent with a pluralistic
economic research methodology described by Bruce
Caldwell (1982). The contrary prevailing, but largely
implicit, view of economic research methodology
asserts that one basic paradigm for economics exists.
This paradigm is usually considered to be the neo-
classical model underlying the theory of the firm,
consumer demand, price determination, partial and
general equilibrium, and welfare economics (see
Hausman, 1992, figure 15.1, p. 271).
In addition to this neoclassical core, numerous
fields exist in economics such as labor economics
and public finance. If empirical work in economics
is to be appraised thoroughly, these fields within
economics should be considered, as well as that
stemming directly from the theoretical core. If this
were done, it would be found that numerous ap-
proaches supplement, replace, and modify the neo-
classical model. Yet, to the best of my knowledge,
there is little literature appraising how decisions get
made which establish limits of applicability of par-
ticular economic models in the various applied fields
of economics. I suspect such decisions by applied
economists typically reflect their judgments that
some models just don’t “work well” in practice.
Standard theoretical assumptions often are replaced
by more realistic auxiliary conditions. This may
limit the scope of the model, but with the result that
it “works better” for the problem at hand.
In other cases, neoclassical economics may be
modified or replaced by institutional economics,
game theory, Austrian economics, or even with
(gasp!) a discipline other than economics. The pro-
cess for making these kinds of paradigm shifts is
not well understood for reasons set forth by Kuhn
(1970). The appendix to this paper constitutes a
mini-essay on intellectual constructs and the limits
of their applicability.
The term “land” as defined here is consistent
with the way classical economists used the term.
Those parts of the natural environment with past,
present, or potential economic value constitute land
as the term is used in this paper. In some passages,
land will refer to a part of the earth’s surface, but
elsewhere the term may be used to pertain to another
part of nature such as the atmosphere, or a species.
In all cases, the context will make clear what is
intended. This paper is mainly about the way agri-
cultural economists have thought about land as
circumstances vary. A subtitle of the paper could
well be: The Ways Agricultural Economists Think
About Land.
Land and Agriculture
Land played a central role in the writings of Adam
Smith, David Ricardo, and Thomas Malthus. In
many respects, these classical economists were the
first agricultural economists. Food production was
a principal economic activity at the time they wrote,
and it is not surprising they devoted considerable
attention to food-land relationships. Land, labor,
and capital were advanced as the principal factors
of production with the justification that each factor
was distinctly different from the others. This point
of view dominated economic literature well into the
20th century.
David Ricardo lived from 1772 to 1823; Thomas
Malthus from 1766 to 1834; and, of course, Smith’s
Wealth of Nations was published in 1776 (Eatwell
and Newman, 1987). Food production technology
changed greatly in the more developed nations
during the century following the death of Malthus.
It is not surprising that 20th century economists
were forced to reconsider the received wisdom with
respect to land and food production.
Two important milestones can be identified. One,
of a conceptual nature, was the work of Frank
Knight on risk and uncertainty, published in 1921.
He directed attention to the importance of the human
agent in adapting to risk and uncertainty. In Knight’s
view, there was no need to distinguish land from
other forms of capital. The other milestone was em-
pirical in nature and occurred when the economics
profession came to understand that food-land rela-
tionships had changed in a fundamental way since
the time of the classicists. If one wishes to date this
milestone, consider 1951, when the T. W. Schultz
article entitled “Declining Economic Importance
of Agricultural Land” appeared in the Economic
Journal.
Shortly after World War II, production economics
emerged as an important part of agricultural eco-
nomics. Earl Heady’s The Economics of Agricultural
Production and Resource Use (1952) influenced the
thinking of many agricultural economists on numer-
ous subjects, including land. Heady saw no need to
give special treatment to land and, consistent with
Knight, believed only labor and capital need be con-
sidered as factors of production.
The work of the agricultural production econ-
omists first focused on the farm firm and then
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considerations. Empirical work multiplied rapidly
as a result of new quantitative techniques and data
processing equipment such as numerical program-
ming and electronic computers. As a result of these
developments, a subtle shift in emphasis occurred
in agricultural economics research. The greatest
emphasis and recognition shifted to quantitative
developments, perhaps at the expense of problem
identification and theoretical awareness.
The agricultural economics policy literature re-
flected these trends as well. Even though empirical
estimates of policy effects were made possible by
the use of sophisticated measurement techniques,
the underlying theoretical base was remarkably
predictable. Constant returns to scale, atomistic
competition, and homogeneous products were often
assumed, and modern welfare economics provided
the normative base of assessment. Technical change
typically was considered an exogenous variable, and
bore responsibility for declining costs over time.
Conclusions resulting from such models usually
either explicitly stated or implied government price
supports were inefficient, and that supply-demand
imbalances would disappear if the industry could
just get through whatever the crisis existed at the
time, assuming government could be persuaded to
leave agriculture alone. This traditional approach did
not anticipate the industrialization of agriculture,
even though economic theory has long recognized
the importance of, and empirical information has
suggested, the reality of increasing as well as con-
stant returns to scale.
The denial that land has characteristics distin-
guishing it from other forms of capital encouraged
the view that agriculture is connected to the rest of
the economy only through input and commodity
markets. This notion resulted in the neglect in the
agricultural economics literature of both positive and
negative nonmarket effects of agricultural output on
the rest of the economy. As will be noted later, a
few resource economists within agricultural eco-
nomics devoted considerable attention to nonmarket
considerations related to land prior to Earth Day in
1970.
The methodology used by the production econo-
mists after World War II was based largely on partial
equilibrium models pioneered by Alfred Marshall.
The work of John R. Hicks and others permitted
ordinal utility assumptions to be substituted for the
cardinal utility formulations of Marshall. The partial
equilibrium models of the early production econo-
mists meant the assumption that “all other things
remain the same” continued to be the prevailing
model for all of the economy which did not fall with-
in the scope of the partial equilibrium model.
In recent years, computable general equilibrium
models have come to economics. These have been
made possible by developments in theoretical eco-
nomics and in data processing technology. There is
little question that many more economic relation-
ships can now be modeled simultaneously than was
the case earlier. Yet even the most elaborate general
equilibrium model must neglect a great deal of eco-
nomic reality. “Partial” and “general” equilibrium
as used in contemporary economics are not end
points that encompass economic activity. Rather,
they are points along a continuum extending far
beyond anything that has been modeled to this time.
The assumption “everything else remains the same”
continues to apply whether made explicit or implicit.
Even so, computable equilibrium models of inter-
dependent economic relations may bring important
information into the open. For example, a recent
general equilibrium study of international trade
reports even modest increasing returns in an in-
dustry can have significant effect on factor demands
(Antweiler and Trefler, 2002).
There are many interests in rural land, over and
above its contribution in agricultural production.
Even so, agricultural economists have a special
responsibility to understand the role that land plays
in agricultural production. A full understanding of
that role depends on a better understanding than we
now have of the relation of technical change to econ-
omies of scale in agricultural production.
The assumption of constant returns to scale, wide-
ly employed in agricultural economics, has been
very convenient in econometric and programming
work. Yet the empirical base for such an assumption
does not appear to this observer to be well estab-
lished. If the ambiguity surrounding this important
relationship is to be removed, the following issues
must be addressed:
P There must be clarity as to whether reference
is being made to agriculture or farming. With
the passage of time, farms have purchased more
inputs and more processing and marketing has
moved off the farm. It seems clear that farms
do not occupy a fixed place in the agricultural
industry.
P The quality of inputs used in farming must be
considered when measuring the quantity of
inputs used over time. Traditional economic
theory treats technical change as exogenous to
the industry, and this results in shifts in theCastle Land, Economic Change, and Agricultural Economics   21
long-run supply function. Yet technical change
occurs in many ways, and when input produc-
tivity changes over time because of endogen-
ous technical change, it is difficult to measure
the quantitative change in inputs over time.
P A part of endogenous technical change has
been associated with the shift of a portion of
farming activity to nonfarm firms in both input
supplying and in output processing and market-
ing. The consequence is that a comparison of
the cost of farm output over time violates an
assumption of a homogeneous output. What
does it mean that costs are constant over time
if the nature of the output changes over time?
These issues are introduced here because they
pertain in an important way to the conceptual foun-
dation of the agricultural policy literature in agri-
cultural economics. I fear this literature has been so
preoccupied with agriculture-government relations
it has neglected important structural considerations
in the industry. The industrialization of agriculture
should not surprise us. The determinants of this




As economic growth occurs, the face of the earth is
modified as a result of that growth. Some changes
may be benign, but not all will be, and there will be
uncertainty about the long-run impact of others. As
incomes rise, and the location and concentration of
people change, the importance ascribed to different
attributes of the natural environment will change as
well.
Earth Day occurred in April of 1970, but by that
time resource economics was a recognized specialty
in both agricultural economics and economics. The
establishment of this specialty anticipated the gener-
al recognition in society that unregulated input and
commodity markets did not, and could not, reflect
the interdependencies imposed by the earth. This
realization directed attention to nonmarket institu-
tions which had been used by societies to define
relations among individuals and groups in the
management of the natural environment. Interests in
such institutions and institutional economics arose
quite naturally.
Classical and neoclassical economics have played
an important role in agricultural economics through-
out its existence. Nevertheless, it would be a great
mistake to neglect institutional and land economics
when discussing land and agriculture. Fortunately,
the late Maurice Kelso provided a short and compe-
tent account of the origin and content of institutional
economics, and how land economics arose from it
(see Castle et al., 1977, pp. 394S406).
It is not surprising that institutional economists
would pay particular attention to land. Many
societies have found it necessary to develop special
institutional devices for the management of land
because of its unique characteristics. The durability
of land, its capacity to serve multiple ends, its
capacity to absorb human-created capital across
generations, and its indivisibility are examples of
characteristics requiring special treatment in formal
and informal institutions, or to be reflected in “the
rules of the game.” Those rules vary over time and
among societies.
For many years, land economics occupied a
respectable, but never a dominant, place within agri-
cultural economics. Three considerations probably
led to its decline after 1950. First, institutional
economics was basically incompatible with logical
positivism, as modified by Popper (1957, 1959), the
dominant philosophy of science in the second
quarter of the 20th century. Institutional economics
lacked a formal theoretical structure to guide
empirical work, although it was, and is, empirically
oriented.
Second, since World War II especially, develop-
ments in neoclassical economic theory and quanti-
tative techniques stimulated research on farm and
marketing firm problems, demand analysis, and
agricultural industry adjustments. Economic theory,
used to guide data collection and analysis, seemed
to be more “scientific” than the writings of institu-
tional land economists. (See the appendix for an
explanation of why agricultural economists may
have embraced the philosophy of Karl Popper.)
Third, shortly after the end of World War II, the
natural resource economists arrived on the scene in
both economics and agricultural economics. Natural
resource economics made considerable use of neo-
classical theory and quantitative techniques, as did
agricultural economics generally. Land economics,
as a specialization within agricultural economics, has
nearly disappeared, and agricultural economics has
become homogeneous methodologically as a conse-
quence.
The economics of institutions, however, still
exists in economics. Douglas North has become a
Nobel Laureate as a result of his work in institu-
tional economics (1990). Rutherford (1994) draws22   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
a distinction between the “old” and “new” institu-
tional economics. The distinction appears to be that
the “new” institutional economists make greater use
of neoclassical economic theory in their research,
and often implicitly or explicitly accept the norms
of welfare economics. The “new” welfare econo-
mists generally come to more conservative policy
positions than did the “older” institutional econo-
mists.
The use of the neoclassical market paradigm for
the analysis of economic institutions poses special
problems. Market incentives are often cited as a
principal reason for institutional change in the new
institutional economics; inefficient institutions be-
come too costly to be tolerated. Yet some institutions
persist for long periods even though they clearly are
inefficient on the basis of market criteria. This leads
to concern about the simultaneous use of market cri-
teria for both normative and positive purposes as is
practiced in the “new” institutional economics.
Is it appropriate to explain the existence of some-
thing on the basis of a criterion, and then judge its
desirability by use of the same criterion? If applied
literally, such a theory would have no capacity to
explain the persistence of nonconforming institutions.
To be sure, the new institutional economists have
explanations for the persistence of “inefficient”
institutions, but such explanations seem to be of an
ad hoc nature, usually pertaining to some form of
path dependence. Unless path dependence can be
explained in institutional terms, a theory of institu-
tional development has not been provided.
Resource and environmental economists now have
their own professional association and journal. The
market paradigm has become paramount. Market
type incentives and outcomes are used to judge the
success or failure of environmental nonmarket insti-
tutions, policies, and programs. The norms assumed
in resource and environmental economics typically
come directly from welfare economics rather than
from concerns reflected by the policy process itself.
The field is based solidly within the neoclassical
paradigm that dominates both economics and agri-
cultural economics.
As one who played a role in the early development
of resource and environmental economics, perhaps
I am entitled to identify some troubling issues I be-
lieve lurk beneath these indicators of success. One
is of a technical and methodological nature. The
other is also methodological, but more fundamental-
ly, an epistemological matter. Permit me to elaborate.
Resource and environmental economics literature
seldom gives explicit attention to the emerging role
of the federal establishment, relative to state and
local government, in environmental policy. Since
the turn of the century, the federal establishment has
assumed considerable responsibility for the devel-
opment and conservation of natural resources. More
recently, especially since Earth Day in 1970, the
federal government has passed environmental legis-
lation pertaining to water, air, and species protection.
Use rights remained largely under state jurisdiction.
Such integration as occurs, other than by litigation,
often comes from the role state agencies play in the
administration of federal programs. Local govern-
ment influence stems mainly from local initiative
within the framework of state law.
Standard welfare economics and neoclassical
policy models do not make provision for decision
units intermediate between firms and individuals at
the micro level and the state at the macro level.
Mainstream resource and environmental economics
reflects this same structure. The implications of
such simplifications become apparent when federal,
state, and local interests come into conflict as they
have recently in the application of the Endangered
Species Act in the Klamath Basin of Oregon. Yet
the problem is a fundamental one, and not of recent
origin.
The maximization of net national benefits is the
standard criterion used in benefit-cost analysis to
judge resource and environmental policy actions
within a nation. Can you imagine those with respon-
sibility for state and local affairs using such a
criterion to evaluate their options? I cannot—perhaps
because I served for seven years as a member of the
Environmental Quality Commission of Oregon. My
knowledge of resource and environmental economics
was useful in that service, but not because I applied
welfare choice criteria or empirical findings from
resource and environmental economics literature.
Perhaps an example will illustrate my concern.
Assume the federal establishment provides financial
aid to farmers who have had water deliveries cur-
tailed because of application of (say) the Endangered
Species Act. From the standpoint of the Nation, any
such payment would create certain negatives or
costs if the standard welfare criterion were used.
2 Of
course, the possible benefit of preserving a species
would be “off the table” because, by decree, species
preservation is of the highest priority, regardless of
cost. Even so, there may be interest in knowing the
amount of economic sacrifice associated with the
2  Some may consider such payments purely as a transfer and at no net
cost to the Nation. However, if the payment requires increased federal
spending, the Nation’s net national product likely will be reduced.Castle Land, Economic Change, and Agricultural Economics   23
water curtailment. From the standpoint of the local
economy, however, government financial aid to
farmers is not a negative, but rather a positive item.
And, of course, the farmer receiving the aid will
consider the payment positively.
Let us now consider outlays farmers might make
for well drilling to obtain groundwater to compen-
sate for the curtailment of surface waters. Such
expenditures would be a cost in the calculus of
farmers, but a benefit from the standpoint of the
local economy. If the well drilling proved to be a
productive investment, it would increase the net
national product and be a positive influence in the
national account. On the other hand, it would be a
negative if this involved additional government
spending. If the payments made to farmers were di-
verted from other government programs, there would
be no cost to the Nation.
These straightforward and simple examples illus-
trate the complex and often conflicting objectives of
decision units as movement is made from the micro
to the macro level. The welfare maximization criter-
ion, or “optimality” assumptions, so readily applied
in resource and environmental economics, results in
gross oversimplification if intermediate decision-
bodies are ignored. If they are not ignored but
considered individually, optimization of the welfare
criterion will accomplish little except to highlight
inconsistencies and conflicts. Recently I heard prize-
winning research described as pertaining to the
“optimal choice of unintended consequences.” For
some time, I have believed economists’ preoccupa-
tion with optimality had gotten out of hand; that
description did nothing to change my mind. Think
about it!
With the help of Daniel Bromley, I now see that
the neglect of intermediate decision-bodies in
resource and environmental economics is but one
manifestation of the second concern I have regarding
contemporary resource and environmental eco-
nomics (Bromley, 1990,1997; Vatn and Bromley,
1994). Economic optimality measures, or benefit-
cost analysis, typically provide the yardstick by
which a particular rule, policy, existing condition,
or practice is judged in the natural resource or envi-
ronmental economics literature. Existing entitlement,
endowment, choice criteria, and income distribution,
except for the item under examination, are assumed
to be optimal or acceptable. The same is true of
prices. Except for the price of the item under exam-
ination, prices are assumed as optimal, acceptable,
or capable of being adjusted. The determination of
“optimality” which results clearly is affected by such
assumptions. The justification usually given is that
the assumed conditions would have been changed
by society if they were not acceptable.
Suppose, however, the real reason a proposal is
supported or opposed by someone in the policy
process is that they wish to change indirectly one,
or more, of the assumed conditions by means of the
proposed policy change. Many, and perhaps most,
policy proposals attract support or opposition
arising from multiple motivations of proponents or
opponents. In such circumstances, economic opti-
mality measures, based on conditions proponents or
opponents wish to change, may be either irrelevant
or misleading to many people because they do not
accept the determinants of the optimality test.
When resource economics first came into exist-
ence approximately a half century ago, an economic
environmental problem was believed to exist if it
was thought decentralized markets did not reflect
incremental social costs and returns. The early
legislation relied mainly on command-and-control
measures to correct market failures. From the out-
set, economists called attention to the contribution
market type incentives could make if used in
conjunction with command-and-control measures.
A fundamental change appears to have occurred in
environmental policy. Instead of presuming markets
have inherent limitations in dealing with environ-
mental issues, the presumption appears to be that
unless an “optimal” market solution is found, a
policy failure has occurred.
Hausman has noted that economists have taken
steps to preserve the “separateness” of core eco-
nomic theory even when the “inexactness” of their
assumptions has been demonstrated. (The term
“inexactness,” as used by Hausman, is a different
concept than unrealism; see Hausman, 1992, chap-
ter 15.) Something of this nature may have occurred
in resource and environmental economics. Although
fraught with theoretical and practical difficulties, a
benefit-cost mentality may be implicitly accepted
by many economists for a wide range of issues
including, but not limited to, resource and environ-
mental economics (Arrow et al., 1996). Many of us
enjoy doing those things we believe we do well,
especially those things we believe we do a bit better
than others. And economists can measure economic
optimality better than anybody, especially as we
define it.
Consider again the Endangered Species Act. The
Act has been interpreted by the highest court in the
land to say that species protection is of the highest
priority, regardless of the cost of doing so. Even24   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
though benefit determination is off the table, many
have legitimate interest in knowing something about
the cost of compliance. Economists have a high com-
parative advantage in supplying such information.
Yet I submit the most important policy issues are of
a different nature. For example, we need to know
far more than we do about how the Act is being
applied, or not applied, in different circumstances.
It is clear the Act is not being applied according
to Congressional intent as stated by the Supreme
Court. We know considerable negotiation occurs
prior to the listing of particular species, and that
political and economic considerations enter into this
process (Huntsberger and Walth, 2002). Until there
is knowledge of how the Act actually works, it is
guaranteed there will be bitterness arising from par-
ticular applications. In addition, there is great need
for debate and discussion of different approaches to
species loss, such as habitat protection, rather than
a single-species approach. Resource and environ-
mental economists can be of great assistance in
illuminating such questions. To do so, they will need
to avoid sweeping under the rug information that is
at variance with disciplinary assumptions. And they
may need to surrender some disciplinary autonomy
in order to work with other disciplines.
Two recent environmental problems bring these
methodological issues into the open. Both involve
knowing when the limits of conceptual models have
been reached. One pertains to appropriate public pol-
icy in the face of possible climate change. The other
deals with the Exxon-Valdez oil spill. I turn first to
climate change.
Since benefit-cost analysis first came on the scene,
economists have been concerned about the appropri-
ate discount rate to use when evaluating government
investment in the natural environment. Numerous
tracts have been written on the subject under the
assumption that an appropriate social rate of dis-
count always exists if only it can be discovered. In
other words, the universal applicability of benefit-
cost analysis is not questioned; the challenge is to
just be clever enough to use it.
Not all economists have been of this persuasion;
Talbot Page (1988) has labeled the search for an
optimal discount rate a “will-o’-the-wisp,” but the
search continued. Recently however, possible
climate change has raised the question of whether
steps should be taken to delay or forestall such a
development. If such steps are to be taken, can
they be evaluated by benefit-cost analysis? If so,
what discount rate should be used? Any finite
discount rate defines a planning horizon that will
not encompass all future effects of climate modifi-
cation measures.
Two leading economists, William D. Nordhaus
and Robert C. Lind, have declared there is no logical
basis for establishing a discount rate for such a prob-
lem. In effect, they have said benefit-cost analysis
may be useful in estimating the opportunity cost of
certain actions. They believe it should not be substi-
tuted for ethical decisions pertaining to the welfare
of different generations.
3,4,5 They are to be com-
mended for stating there are limits to the applicabil-
ity of a conceptual framework.
In the case of the Exxon-Valdez oil spill, the law
required that damages be assessed on the basis of
the damages inflicted on individuals and the environ-
ment. Our system of justice, of course, requires this
should be done for those who were damaged and can
be identified, because compensation can and should
be paid to them. Moreover, damages to the environ-
ment may well affect people in future generations,
3  William D. Nordhaus has long been concerned about climate change.
He writes:
P Ad hoc manipulation of a discount rate to achieve long-term goals is
a very poor substitute for policies that focus directly on the ultimate
objective. Moreover, there is no simple formula for modifying
discount rates that incorporate long-term objectives in an efficient
manner.
P The dilemma of whether or how much to override conventional mar-
ket or benefit-cost criteria is not usefully informed by the use of
special, low overall or sector-specific discount rates. These merely
hide the underlying trade-off between the long-term objective and the
economic cost.
P Focusing on ultimate objectives has the advantage of showing trade-
offs explicitly, making the cost of violating a benefit-cost rule trans-
parent and allowing public decision-makers to weigh the options
rather than having technicians hide the choices in complicated and ab-
strusely argued second-best rules of thumb (Nordhaus, 1999, p. 158).
4  Perhaps Robert C. Lind has given as much attention to the problem
of discounting as any contemporary economist. He states:
… I do not believe that a decision such as whether to go forward with
a program to mitigate global warming can be made on the basis of a
decision model that projects future costs and benefits and discounts
them to a present value using any rate of discount. In this regard, I am
in agreement with Thomas Schelling that the fundamental choice is
whether to transfer resources from the present and near-term future
generations to generations living in the distant future that may be
better off or worse off, and an exponential discount rate or a market
rate of interest is largely irrelevant to making this ethical decision.
Further, I believe this decision requires more information than is
often contained in a discounted cash flow analysis, such as how rich
are current generations compared with future generations? This
means, in particular, that I reject the arguments associated with the
approaches to choosing a discount rate based on a utilitarian welfare
function as set forth in optimal growth models. A corollary to this is
that these models and this mode of analysis cannot tell us what the
optimal policy with regard to climate mitigation is either (Lind, 1999,
p. 174).
For Shelling’s position, see: Thomas Schelling (1995), “Intergenerational
Discounting,” Energy Policy, vol. 23, no. 4/5, pp. 379S401 (as cited in
Lind, 1999).
5  The positions set forth by Nordhaus and Lind are consistent with the
writings of Talbot Page on this subject, at least since 1988. See Castle and
Berrens (1993) for a similar argument.Castle Land, Economic Change, and Agricultural Economics   25
as well as those geographically dispersed, yet for
practical reasons such individuals cannot be identi-
fied individually and cannot be paid compensation.
The argument given for estimating the losses such
people might suffer was to assess the polluter an
equivalent amount.
The beautiful symmetry of equating losses and
assessments appealed to many economists. Econo-
mists flocked to the controversy of whether contin-
gent valuation was an appropriate technique for
estimating passive use values for those, distant in
space and time, who may have suffered a loss of
well-being as a result of the spill. It was financially
rewarding for economists to do so, of course, be-
cause there were juicy consulting opportunities on
both sides of the dispute. Yet little attention was
directed to the logic of equating polluter assessments
to possible losses incurred by people dispersed
in space and time (for exceptions, see Vatn and
Bromley, 1994; Castle, Berrens, and Adams, 1994).
Discussion of this question not only would have
directed attention to the appropriateness of benefit-
cost procedures here, but also to laws and admin-
istrative procedures pertaining to such matters. A
relatively new methodology was available, contin-
gent valuation, which held promise for assigning
monetary measures to passive use values. The
ensuing debate had little to do with the social
problem that needed to be addressed, the prevention
of future spills. Economics is relevant to the solution
of such a problem, but it is not primarily a problem
of economic optimality. It requires a value judgment
that oil spills are undesirable, and then investigation
of the best way of preventing them.
6
If resource and environmental economists embark
on the kinds of policy research relevant to the diffi-
cult issues identified here, rather than the endless
search for economic optimality, they will encounter
a different set of problems. They will find it neces-
sary to work closely with representatives of other dis-
ciplines. In this connection, I call special attention to
environmental ecology and environmental biology.
There is growing tension between resource and
environmental economists on the one hand and envi-
ronmental biology and ecology on the other. This is
not the kind of problem that will be settled in the
usual forums of bringing disciplines together. Every
thoughtful biologist, ecologist, and economist inter-
ested in the natural environment should, I believe,
direct attention to this problem. I do not believe it is
in the long-run interest of these disciplines to permit
this situation to continue to deteriorate. These disci-
plines are important contributors to the scientific base
of resource environmental policy. Yet many do not
agree even on the extent, much less the nature, of en-
vironmental problems that exist. This situation would
be of less concern if those involved were attempting
to resolve their differences by methods of dispute
resolution traditional in the scientific community.
The extreme (disgraceful?) reaction of some bio-
logical scientists to The Skeptical Environmentalist
(Lomborg, 1998) in Nature appears to be more a
manifestation of hostility than a difference of opinion
within the scientific community (see Nature, Novem-
ber 8, 2001 and May 2, 2001).
7 Some biologists and
ecologists apparently have similar impressions of
economists. They are appalled at the notion that eco-
nomic analysis would be considered an appropriate
base for certain environmental decisions. To their
mind, economic activity is the cause of the problem,
and they want to go “outside the box” for a solution.
They are suspicious of solutions which depend on
criteria that come from “inside the box,” and appear
to believe economists are wedded to the market
paradigm with a tenacity that cannot be explained in
science alone. They may be as perplexed as we are
in regard to an appropriate base for dialogue.
Not all biological scientists react in the way some
have to The Skeptical Environmentalist. And the re-
cent writings of Nordhaus and Lind demonstrate all
economists are not wedded to rigid benefit-cost anal-
ysis. There may exist a basis for dialogue among
representatives of both disciplines who recognize
the need to identify limits to the applicability of
every conceptual approach, even our own.
8
6  These remarks are not intended to be critical of attempts to value non-
market goods and services generally or of contingent valuations specifically.
The criticism is directed toward the failure to establish a case for doing so
for this oil spill.
7  Prior to the publication of Lomborg’s book, The Skeptical Environ-
mentalist, the Economist ran an essay by Lomborg which offered a sum-
mary of this work. Subsequently, the Economist reviewed the book highly
favorably. This began an extremely heated debate involving the Economist;
some of Lomborg’s chief critics, Paul Ehrlich, E. O. Wilson, Stuart Pimm,
and Jeff Harvey; and independent members of the scientific community. For
Lomborg’s essay and the full text of the position held by the Economist, see
its publications of August 4, 2001, pp. 63S65, and February 2, 2002, pp.
15S16 and 74S76. For an excerpt of the position held by Wilson et al., as
published in Nature, see November 8, 2001, pp. 149S150; for the full text,
see Wilson et al., “Biodiversity Distortions in Lomborg’s The Skeptical
Environmentalist,” online at www.ucsusa.org. For Ehrlich’s position, see
Nature, May 2, 2002, pp. 21S22. For responses to Lomborg’s critics by
independent members of the scientific community, see Nature, January 24,
2002 (Budiansky, p. 364), and March 28, 2002 (Pielke, pp. 367S368).
8  In closing this section, I call attention to a contemporary resource and
environmental economist, Daniel Bromley. More than any person I know,
he has probed the fundamentals of the questions I have identified here. In
doing so, he has drawn upon some of the concepts of the old institutional
economists, John R. Commons and Thorstein Keblen, and modern prag-
matic philosophy. The road he has chosen to travel has been a lonely one
at times, I am sure. Nevertheless, I believe we are all in his debt.26   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Land and Economic Growth
As economic growth and change occur, the use of
space becomes of greater importance as commercial
and residential users compete with each other and
with agricultural users for particular locations. Land
cannot be viewed only as an item entering indi-
vidual production and consumption functions, even
when allowance is made for externalities. It may
also become a tool to achieve collective ends, or
to guide and shape economic change. No single
conceptual framework has been discovered appro-
priate for an understanding of the multiple roles
played by land under conditions of growth and
change.
The theory of the firm provides a framework for
an analysis of the role of land in agriculture, when
it is assumed agriculture is connected to the remain-
der of the economy through input and commodity
markets. Welfare economics and benefit-cost
analysis have provided a comparable framework for
the consideration of environmental externalities. As
noted in the previous paragraph, the role of land in
economic growth becomes exceedingly complex.
Both private and public land use issues are involved.
Attention must be given to all competing uses of
land, and this immediately broadens the scope of
analysis. Rural economics becomes more descriptive
of the scope of analysis than agricultural or resource
economics. Group action at the local level must be
considered, and this may require insights from disci-
plines other than economics.
Central Place Theory
Central place theory provides the principal concep-
tual lens economists use to understand the geographic
implications of private sector activity. Such under-
standing is of great importance, of course, in public
land use policy, even though “optimal” private
sector activity is not necessarily an appropriate
normative standard for collective decisions. With
this orientation, the central city is the beginning
point from which all other economic activity stems,
and has become the principal orientation of the field
of urban economics. In its original formulation,
central place theory did not make the hinterlands
interesting places, although James Hite (1997, 1999)
shows a great deal can be deduced about economic
activity located far from the central city core.
No attempt will be made here to do justice to the
extensive literature on central place theory and appli-
cation. The name of Walter Isard (1956) looms large
in this connection. Writing in 1953, T. W. Schultz
offered a hypothesis about divergences in economic
development related to location (see chapter 9).
The key argument was that rural factor markets
worked better when there was easy access to the
urban industrial complex. And many agricultural
economists have worked in this arena, including
George Tolley and the late Lee Bawden. There are
many contemporary agricultural economists noted
for their work within this paradigm, including Tom
Johnson and David Kraybill.
Krugman (1991, 1995) modified traditional cen-
tral place theory by developing concepts that have
become a part of what today is known as new growth
theory. Hite has demonstrated the new growth theory
increases the deductions that can be made from
central place theory concerning the hinterlands.
Kilkenny (1998a,b, 1999) has done original theoret-
ical work in this arena, and has also made empirical
estimations of spatial relationships.
In recent research, Wu (2002) has modified the
assumptions typically associated with central place
theory. Rather than assume a featureless plane, he
permitted amenity values to enter location decisions.
This modification suggests there may be different
reasons for urban “sprawl” and skip distances than
traditional central place theory suggests. Wu and
Plantinga (2002) have examined the impacts of
open space designation on the urban landscape in a
spatial city model with two empirically relevant
features: (a) residents prefer to live close to open
space, and (b) open space amenities attract migrants
to the city. This model indicates open space policies
should be viewed neither as independent of, nor
necessarily compatible with, growth management
goals.
The record of economists in serving public land
policy formation and administration is mixed. Econ-
omists and lawyers have long recognized use and
development rights in land could be separated, and
devised policies for permitting this to happen. This
permitted individual, as well as collective, objectives
to be considered. In my opinion, we have done less
well with zoning and similar land use policies. The
so-called “Smart Growth” policies have not yet
spawned a literature with significant standing in
economic doctrine. A concept of “metropolitanism”
has been advanced which appears to be at odds
factually with descriptive literature about “edge” and
“galactic” cities (Katz and Bradley, 1999; Lewis,
1995; Garreau, 1998).
As noted earlier, state and local governments have
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use, as does the federal government. Federal and
state programs frequently are manifested at the local
level in an inconsistent and uncoordinated fashion.
When local government can speak for the principal
interests in its jurisdiction, it may be able to influ-
ence federal and state programs. The effectiveness
of local government depends to a considerable extent
on whether there are local groups with sufficient
common interests and shared norms to advance a
collective cause.
The Local Community
As Hausman (1992) notes, the assumptions of eco-
nomic theory typically are inexact. This does not
mean they are false, but rather that they are incom-
plete. One manifestation of this incompleteness is
the neglect of intermediate groups in much economic
modeling, as was noted in the previous section of
this paper. An examination of local group decision
making directs attention to whether the concept of
community, as that term is defined in sociology, is
of relevance in economics.
Distinctions between rural and urban, metropolitan
and nonmetropolitan, and the city and the country-
side, are becoming increasingly blurred. Such
categories have always been arbitrary, but they may
do more harm than good in the contemporary scene
as attempts are made to establish collective land use
policies. In the analysis of many issues, there is a
need to proceed directly to more fundamental vari-
ables such as population density, space, and distance.
This, in turn, directs attention to the need for local
government to coordinate with other units of govern-
ment both horizontally and vertically. Whether this
will happen depends in an important way on the
extent to which people recognize they have shared
interests with those in another jurisdiction. The tradi-
tional local community served a more homogeneous
population, in both production and consumption,
than is now the case. More recently, special groups
have arisen to address particular needs, but often
over a different geographic area than was previously
the case. An unintended consequence of local land
use control measures may be the concentration of
lower income rural residents in particular jurisdic-
tions (Fitchen, 1991).
The meshing of individual decision making with
collective choices is of interest to sociologists as well
as economists. The presidential address of David L.
Brown to the Rural Sociological Society, entitled
“Migration and Community: Social Networks in a
Multilevel World,” is reported in the March 2002
issue of Rural Sociology. Brown’s message is that
migration and community concepts have comple-
mentary roles in sociology. As a demographer, he
reflects the view that the study of migration will not
reach its potential unless the conceptual framework
used provides both for group objectives as well as
individual decision making (p. 3). He attributes the
demise of human ecology in the study of migration
in part to the inadequate provision it made for indi-
vidual autonomy and action.
In a paper published in Rural Sociology (Sep-
tember 2002), I maintain the interdisciplinary con-
cept of social capital, as formulated by Coleman, is
of value in meshing individual expectations with
group actions. My proposal is that the total capital
available to a community can be classified as social,
human, human-created, and natural. All these forms
of capital arise from individualistic motivations.
Individual title to each can be held in some degree,
except for social capital. Because social capital is a
public good, individual appropriation of such a good
is counterproductive because use by one does not
preclude use by another. To make the total capital
concept operational, individual and group decision
making need to be integrated at the local level. The
total rural capital concept requires that differences
in the various forms of capital be recognized, but
that no one form be emphasized to the exclusion of
the others.
The land economists correctly surmised it is not
realistic to consider land independent of social
arrangements for its use and control. Economic
models which proceed directly from individuals and
firms at the micro level to the macro level are unable
to accommodate such realities. Central place theory
has long made it clear that factor combinations will
vary with distance. Yet central place theory does not
provide a theoretical basis for group as well as indi-
vidual decision making.
There are significant implications in both eco-
nomics and sociology if the concept of social capital
is interpreted as I propose. In economics, it means
social capital must meet certain requirements if it is
to qualify as capital. In sociology, it means the
modifier social cannot acquire meaning which is not
relevant to that which it modifies, capital. Specifi-
cally, this means social capital cannot be regarded
as a social theory, or as encompassing particular
normative goals.
But does social capital qualify as capital? A
recent article in the Journal of Economic Literature
by Sobel (March 2002) provides an excellent
discussion of this question. Clearly, many forms of28   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
social capital require sacrifice and permit invest-
ment. As Coleman (1990) advanced the concept,
social capital arises when group action permits
individuals to better achieve their aspirations than if
they act independently. To be sure, social capital is
in the nature of a public good, but that is also true of
certain forms of natural capital. The demand for
social capital is a derived demand; it does not have
an explicit price, but it may be valued implicitly in
an economic system.
As is the case for any form of capital, useful dis-
cussion requires consideration be given to specific,
as well as general, types of social capital. In
Coleman’s estimation, the family and community
were the primary forms of social capital. He asserted
the incentives for social capital formation were
weak, and that it arose as a by-product of other activ-
ities. The early empirical work on social capital by
Putnam (1995) emphasized civic or social organiza-
tions that did “good works” in addition to socializing
functions. Woolcock (1997), however, generalized
the concept greatly and discussed social capital for-
mation across, as well as within, groups. Across, or
inter-, group social capital relations tend to be more
formal and impersonal. Viewed in this way, much
of institutional economics in one way or another
overlaps with, or can be considered, social capital.
Consistent with this view, social capital arrange-
ments would include: a partnership involving no
more than two people, a cooperative with large
numbers, a community-based economic develop-
ment group, as well as a cartel. Many social capital
arrangements are in the nature of public goods in
that additional use would not preclude existing uses,
although, in some cases, additional uses or users
might decrease the value of existing use. In such
circumstances, entry may be controlled, and exclud-
ability be practiced.
The great advantage of the social capital concept
from the standpoint of rural economics is that it per-
mits intermediate level decision making to become
endogenous in economic analysis. Even though geo-
graphic interdependence exists in more developed
societies, geography also conveys a degree of
uniqueness to each local area. The control of (say)
40% of the land of rural community is not likely to
be of significance regionally or nationally, but such
an ownership or control pattern may be exceedingly
significant in affecting opportunities within such a
community.
Knowledge of social capital arrangements may
be necessary to (say) understanding the income
patterns, migration, or history of rural places. The
literature on collective choice and the theory of
cooperation may be of considerable relevance in
rural economics. Recent articles by Daniel Bromley
and Gordon Rausser (ed. Dinar, 2000) demonstrate
rigorously how individual aspirations are best
achieved by cooperation when interdependence in
the use of a natural resource exists. Traditional eco-
nomic efficiency measures associated with decen-
tralized markets will not be descriptive of reality
under such circumstances. Economic models that
abstract from such realities will not explain out-
comes, or serve prescriptive purposes well.
In summary, the social capital concept assists
local community understanding by (a) integrating
individual and group actions in intermediate deci-
sion making; (b) directing explicit attention to the
relation of past, present, and future conditions be-
cause of the durability of capital; and (c) permitting
all forms of capital—human, social, natural, and
human-created—to be integrated in a single system.
Even though group cooperation at the local level
has long been a characteristic of farm communities,
recent developments in agricultural industry appear
to have weakened local ties and encouraged connec-
tions along commodity or other special interest
lines. Although many, including some agricultural
economists, accept the myth that “agriculture” and
“rural” are synonymous terms, in my opinion farmers
have a great deal to lose from such an attitude. In
most rural places, farmers are in a minority even
within their own communities; nationally, more farm
family income is derived from off-farm sources than
on-farm sources.
There is more to be said for viewing agriculture
from a rural community perspective than there is for
viewing the rural community from an agricultural
perspective. The implications of doing so are several.
For example, community developments would be
evaluated as to the amount and types of off-farm
employment which would affect farm family income.
Once this step is taken, agricultural interests will
come to adopt the perspective of individuals and
businesses that may locate in the community. Prac-
tical people and programs may be ahead of the agri-
cultural economics literature on such issues, although
the work of the sociologist, Woolcock (1997), is of
great relevance.
Rural Economics—A Pluralistic Specialization
The previous discussion indicates rural economics
requires different approaches from within econom-
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assumptions of classical and neoclassical economics.
Institutional considerations are also relevant. Game
theory and imperfect competition have application
as well as collective choice. More than either
production economics or resource economics, rural
economics is pluralistic.
Rural economics is one discipline within the multi-
disciplinary field of rural studies. The social prob-
lems of the countryside continue as areas of concern.
These problems include poverty, welfare reform,
rural schools, rural health services, land use planning,
and rural resources and the environment. Rural
studies will develop best if research, education, and
extension efforts all are forthcoming. Although fund-
ing has been difficult to come by, conditions may be
changing. Much will depend on whether agricul-
tural interests will continue to view rural studies as
a threat, or as complementary, to a healthy agricul-
ture. It must be admitted, however, the 2002 Farm
Bill is not encouraging in this respect.
How is rural economics viewed by the agricul-
tural economics profession, the land grant system,
and by the USDA research and educational estab-
lishment? Clearly a great deal of encouragement has
been provided to this time. The American Agricul-
tural Economics Association has a section on com-
munity economics. The USDA has a distinguished
record of accomplishment in documenting conditions
and economic change in rural places. As one who
was present during the formative years of both
production economics and resource economics, I
believe rural economics now compares favorably
with those fields on the basis of critical mass of
researchers, problem importance, and conceptual
framework. Nevertheless, it is important that the
distinctions among these fields be kept in mind
when comparisons and evaluations are made. At
least for the foreseeable future, rural economics will
be more pluralistic. This provides a source of vigor
and breadth not only to agricultural economics, but
to the land grant-USDA complex as well.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper maintains changing economic conditions
and varying perspectives of economic analysts have
resulted in great differences in the way land is con-
sidered in economic doctrine. Three contexts have
been analyzed. The first considered agricultural
land use where agriculture was connected to the rest
of the economy exclusively through input and com-
modity markets, and when all other parts of the
economy were assumed to remain constant. The
second connected agriculture to the remainder of the
economy by virtue of a shared natural environment.
This facilitated a discussion of natural resource and
environmental economics in relation to agricultural
economics, institutional economics, and land eco-
nomics. In the third context, economic change in the
entire economy was permitted with particular atten-
tion given to population density, space, and distance.
The topic of private and public decision making
also was discussed with explicit attention given to
federal, state, and local division of powers.
As we look to the future, applied economists con-
cerned with land will need to give special attention
to the particular circumstances and to the social
problems driving their inquiry. This may limit the
scope of economic models as implied by the theoret-
ical core of economics, and may require the partici-
pation of non-economists as well. Such tendencies
should not necessarily be resisted. Land has long
been a complicating factor in economic analysis,
but it is important that its role be understood in the
context of actual situations and the social problem
of concern at the time. When viewed in this way, it
can become a source of breadth and depth for both
economists and economic doctrine.
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Appendix:
Intellectual Constructs and the Limits 
of their Applicability: A Digression
Richard Just noted in his 2001 Fellows address to the
American Agricultural Economics Association that the
analysis of historical data by even the most sophisticated
techniques may be of little help in current decision making
when public policy, or technology, changes rapidly. Just
surely is correct in noting the ability to explain historical
data does not necessarily mean an economic model is
applicable currently.
There is less basis for associating such an approach
with the philosopher Karl Popper (1959). Popper believed
in risky conjectures which were capable of being falsified.
If the objective is to understand current affairs, it is doubt-
ful Popper would believe econometric models applied to
historical economic data would constitute such a test. It
may well be that few theories are capable of being
falsified as Popper envisioned they should, or could,
be. But it is doubtful economists should blame Popper
for our preoccupation with “tests” based on historical
data. Such econometric work should be evaluated on
the basis of whether it contributes to improved under-
standing of the economic history of whatever period is
being analyzed, rather than constituting a “test” of an
economic theory.
Economists should not blame Popper for their claim
that their work was consistent with his definition of
science, and thereby create the impression economists
were “scientific” as a consequence. Although Popper
spoke favorably of the use of mathematics in economics,
there is little evidence to suggest he ever made a judgment
that the econometric evaluation of historical data was con-
sistent with his definition of science (De Marchi, 1988).
Popper even wrote a book (The Poverty of Historicism,
1957) on the limitations of history in providing evidence
for scientific “tests.”
How, then, should it be decided if, or when, a theory
or conceptual model has reached the limits of its appli-
cability? Rather than relying on comparisons of empirical
estimates of different conceptual approaches, skillful
applied economists, and thoughtful practical people,
apparently evaluate the output of economic models with
various plausibility tests. Does the model yield results
consistent with information that has proven reliable under
other circumstances? To be sure, the “other circumstances”
may reflect historical conditions the analyst may be trying
to escape, but the experienced analyst may make subjec-
tive allowance for how “other circumstances” vary among
situations. The ultimate test, of course, is whether an eco-
nomic model works well in practice, and this often means
how well it helps anticipate future events. The real-world
application of economic models to practical affairs is
indeed a hazardous activity. Errors are often costly, not
only to those making the application, but to others in
society as well.
In economics there are few substitutes for real-world
tests, experimental economics notwithstanding. There may
be instances when it is possible to subject theoretical con-
jectures to actual experience, in addition to comparing
predictions with the results of designed experiments.
McClosky (1985, see especially chapters 4 and 5) has
noted theoretical approaches typically depend on funda-
mental propositions that are matters of faith which have
not been subjected to empirical verification. Such “faith-
based” propositions may be accepted implicitly by
followers of a particular approach, even though they may
be quite conscious of unstated propositions when they en-
counter an approach “outside their box.” In such cases,
they may demand documentation of implicit propositions
of unfamiliar approaches, even as they resent a compar-
able request by others.
It is constructive to consider the recent experience of
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), an investment
firm that relied heavily on markets involving arbitrage,
options, and derivatives (Lowenstein, 2000). The partners
of LTCM operated as though there were no limits to the
reach and power of markets. In economics, their motiva-
tion would be described as profit maximization; “greed”
would more commonly be used in ordinary discourse.
Among LTCM partners were Nobel Laureates in
economics, Robert C. Merton and Myron C. Scholes,
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of derivatives. Several major financial institutions pro-
vided LTCM credit—but only for a while. Even though
market theory may yield reliable predictions over time,
or for particular circumstances, such a theory may not do
well for all circumstances or for a particular time. Appar-
ently LTCM failed to make proper allowance for these
imperfections, and credit constraints eventually brought
them down. Yet this did not occur before they had thrown
a major scare into global financial markets. Alan Green-
span facilitated a meeting of creditors, who then decided
to pull the plug from the bathtub of credit LTCM had
been enjoying. The demise of the firm occurred before
major damage was done to global financial markets.
There are parallels between the LTCM experience and
the recent collapse of the Enron Corporation. In the case
of Enron, however, collapse did not occur before signifi-
cant pain and suffering were inflicted on many who were
not responsible. Regulated utilities provided the original
base for the Enron Corporation. Deregulation provided
incentive for mergers and created markets for energy, and
property instruments making claims to energy. Enron en-
gaged in energy marketing with gusto, and then expanded
its trading activities to many other items. So far as I know,
a complete and generally accepted explanation for the
collapse of Enron does not yet exist, although numerous
factors apparently contributed. Practical people, both in-
side and outside the corporation, became concerned about
the movement of Enron debt to subsidiary corporations
which distorted the Enron balance sheets and income
statements. When Enron’s stock prices began to decline,
a “run on the bank” occurred.
In both cases, there seems to have been an implicit faith
in the reach and power of markets, fueled by enormous
greed. In the case of LTCM, historical data had been
analyzed but extensive experience with arbitrage opera-
tions involving derivates and options apparently did not
exist. In both cases, great reliance was placed on concep-
tual models that had not been used extensively under
actual circumstances. Hopefully, it was coincidence that
LTCM had two Nobel Laureates in economics as
partners, and that a PhD economist was Chairman of the
Board at Enron, with a Harvard MBA as CEO. In each of
these instances, there appeared to be an implicit faith in
the capacity of the market to discover and internalize all
relevant information.
As noted, practical people, inside and outside the
Enron Corporation, triggered its decline. In the case of
Long-Term Capital Management, two practical investors,
Warren Buffet and George Soros, declined to participate,
although they were invited to do so. Concerning LTCM,
Soros is quoted as saying: “The idea that you have a bell
shaped curve is false. You have outlying phenomena that
you can’t anticipate on the basis of previous experience”
(Lowenstein, 2000, p. 149). Clearly, Soros has criteria for
judging the limits of applicability of conceptual models.
It is unlikely a single, grand economic model will ever
permit an analysis of all land-related economic events.
Debates about the relative merits of various conceptual
approaches make for interesting meetings of economists,
but often fail to reflect the reality these concepts probably
were advanced to illuminate different parts of reality in
the first place. We are fortunate the literature provides
different conceptual treatments of land, because a plur-
alistic approach permits us to gather information and
develop insights that would be excluded by a single
approach.